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Introduction
Researchers, regulators and the U.S. Congress have questioned the viability of the thrift
industry in recent years. First, a major increase in interest rates substantially weakened
the industry in the early 1980s. Then, under regulatory pressure to restore adequate
capital levels, as well as market pressure to restore adequate net interest margins, many
thrift ﬁnancial managers substituted credit risk for interest-rate risk, which resulted in an
extraordinary volume of bad real estate loans. This risk increase led to a substantial
number of thrift failures. The surge in thrift proﬁtability in 1992, as interest rates fell to
their lowest levels in almost twenty years, is a further indication that these institutions
continue to operate with a short-funded capital structure and that their underlying
proﬁtability may be almost entirely a result of this structure.1
The regulatory issues associated with the viability of these specialized mortgage-
lending institutions are numerous. For example, the 1989 Financial Institutions, Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) substantially increased regulatory pressure
on the thrift industry. Other authors have noted that the qualiﬁed thrift lender (QTL) test
in FIRREA increases instability by forcing thrifts to remain specialized mortgage
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Abstract.  A number of studies have argued that the thrift industry is not viable as it is
presently structured and regulated because mortgage yields are inadequate to cover interest
and operating costs. This hypothesis suggests that observed proﬁtability is primarily the
result of the tendency of the industry to “ride” the yield curve by borrowing short and
lending long. To evaluate this argument, we construct a simultaneous-equations model of
thrift risk (maturity gap positions) and return (net interest margin). We ﬁnd support for the
notion that the industry could not be reasonably proﬁtable if it did not take on signiﬁcant
interest-rate risk. For instance, a zero gap position produces a return on assets of only 19
basis points and a return on equity of only 4%. We also estimate the amount of interest-rate
risk the industry can employ to increase returns on equity and assets. Our estimates show
that over 50% of thrift proﬁts earned during this period are the result of negative gap
positions and interest-rate speculation. As earlier research shows, changes in regulations
affecting thrift asset and liability choices can be counterproductive.
M. Cary Collins*
Van Son Lai**
James E. McNulty***lenders. The 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)
mandates early intervention and prompt corrective action for poorly capitalized ﬁnancial
institutions. Nonetheless, many analysts argue that the thrift industry’s simultaneous
dependence on mortgage-related assets and on short-term liabilities creates an untenable,
long-run situation and a signiﬁcant strain on the U.S. ﬁnancial system. These analysts
point to the large number of major thrift failures over the last ten years and to the more
recent taxpayer bailout of the thrift insurance fund as ample evidence that an industry
composed of specialized mortgage lenders is not viable.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the viability argument by focusing on the role
of maturity gap positions and the traditional net interest margin (NIM) in determining
thrift proﬁtability.2 Using a simultaneous-equations system on thrifts spanning the
period 1984 through 1988, we ﬁnd support for the notion that the industry could not be
reasonably proﬁtable if it did not take on signiﬁcant interest-rate risk. For instance, a zero
maturity gap position produces a return on assets of only 19 basis points and a return on
equity of only 4%. In estimating the amount of interest-rate risk the industry can employ
to increase returns on equity and assets, we show that over 50% of thrift proﬁts earned
during the 1984 through 1988 period are the result of negative gap positions and interest-
rate speculation. As earlier theoretical research shows, changes in the regulations
constraining thrift asset choices can have a signiﬁcant and unintended effect on thrift
proﬁtability. Our evidence suggests that the most prudent regulatory course is one
expanding the asset and liability powers of thrifts, rather than the more recent regulatory
attempts to restrict investment in non-mortgage assets.
The next section reviews the existing literature to develop a framework for investigating
thrift viability. In the third section, we present a simultaneous-equations model of NIM
and various maturity gaps with empirical and theoretical underpinnings. We discuss the
empirical results of our analysis in the fourth section, presenting our conclusions in the
ﬁnal section.
Literature Review
Microeconomic theories of the banking ﬁrm have been developed by Klein (1971), and
Sealey and Lindley (1977), as well as others. O’Hara (1983) develops a model in which
the asset portfolio, the composition of the bank’s deposit liabilities and other borrowings,
ﬁrm scale, and the equity capital level are all endogenously determined. She shows,
among other things, that holding only one type of asset is non-optimal. The implication
is that the specialized lending strategy followed by most thrifts as a result of regulatory
constraints is non-optimal. Contrary to Klein (1971), she ﬁnds that the optimal structure
of the asset portfolio is dependent on the structure of the bank’s liability portfolio and
vice versa. Her model can be summarized as follows:
Return5f ( r, ACOMP, FFR, LCOMP, E).
O’Hara shows that the returns to a ﬁnancial institution are a function of the marginal
costs of borrowing (r), the structure of the asset portfolio (ACOMP), the amount of ﬁrm
non-deposit borrowings (FFR), the structure of the deposit liability portfolio, and the
level of equity capital in the ﬁrm. O’Hara (1983) provides only a partial analysis of the
interest-rate risk position of the ﬁnancial institution, however, since she does not allow
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the institution as rates change.
While O’Hara (1983) and Klein (1971), as well as others, consider the funding and
interest-rate environment exogenous for modelling the banking ﬁrm, Morgan and Smith
(1987) endogenize the funding environment in a theoretical model of ﬁnancial
intermediation. Morgan and Smith provide a detailed analysis of the funding decision,
particularly with respect to the maturity intermediation (gap) choices of the ﬁrm, and the
level and variability of the interest-rate environment. Their ﬁndings suggest that the
minimum risk maturity gap is not necessarily the zero-gap position, but rather the
minimum risk maturity gap is dependent on the market interest-rate level and variability,
as well as future loan demand. For instance, risk-averse intermediaries wish to hedge
against low future loan demand states of the work, since these are associated with low
proﬁts from short-term lending. As long as deposit rates and future loan rates are
positively associated, the ﬁnancial institution can achieve some risk reduction from a
negative gap position.
Approaching the thrift viability argument from an empirical standpoint, Carron and
Brumbaugh (1989) suggest that the spread between mortgage yields and deposit costs is
insufﬁcient to cover a thrift’s operating costs. For the period 1982 to the ﬁrst quarter of
1989, they compute the return on mortgages to be 14.37% (after adjusting for default
risk) and the seven-year Treasury rate to be 13.63%, for a net spread of 74 basis points.
Using a cost-of-funds ﬁgure at 100 basis points over the Treasury, they conclude that
purely duration-matched thrifts would have experienced zero proﬁts over the period 1986
through 1989, and losses over the period 1982 through 1985. If their analysis is correct,
any sustained proﬁtability observed in this industry during the 1980s must be the result
of maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities, i.e., interest-rate speculation. 
While it is intuitively appealing, the Carron and Brumbaugh argument has some
limitations. First, the authors rely solely on aggregate industry data. This information
source cannot capture differences in operating costs across thrifts. For instance, thrifts
with lower operating costs can survive with lower spreads between mortgage yields and
deposit costs. Carron and Brumbaugh also neglect differences in the ability of thrifts to
generate fee income as a means of supplanting net interest margins. Second, the Carron-
Brumbaugh analysis is not a theoretical model of thrift viability, but rather a descriptive
study of the industry’s position. Econometric studies have concluded that the thrift
industry could have been proﬁtable in the late 1970s and early 1980s if institutions had
hedged their interest-rate risk exposure (Hess, 1987). Finally, Carron and Brumbaugh
look at the proﬁtability of mortgage lending in isolation, rather than in a portfolio
context. In a portfolio context, low covariances among asset returns can reduce risk
substantially. Although studying commercial banks with smaller mortgage portfolios as
a fraction of total assets—approximately 45% on average—Eisenbeis and Kwast (1991)
show that commercial banks that specialize in mortgage lending are highly proﬁtable and
have less risk than their non-mortgage lending counterparts.
Our study empirically tests the thrift-industry viability hypothesis using the critical
factors considered by O’Hara (1983), Morgan and Smith (1987) and others. Consistent
with Carron and Brumbaugh, we deﬁne viability as the ability to operate proﬁtably 
with a matched-maturity strategy (a zero gap position).3 In contrast to Carron and
Brumbaugh, however, the test is based on individual ﬁrm data. Therefore, we do not need
to specify a priori the net interest margin an institution would require to be proﬁtable.
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Until recently, the conventional method for analyzing the ﬁnancial performance of
ﬁnancial institutions was a single equation, ordinary least squares regression model.
Given the fact that a change on one side of the balance sheet automatically affects the
other side, and that the income statement is affected by both, Graddy and Kyle (1979,
1980) ﬁrst made the case for using simultaneous-equations techniques in the analysis of
ﬁnancial institution performance. Ordinary least squares is inappropriate in this context
because the explanatory variables will not be independent of the error term.
A Risk-Return Model of Thrift Viability
In part one of our study, we use three-stage least squares estimation to construct a
simultaneous-equations model of interest-rate risk and return for thrift institutions. 3SLS
estimation permits us to use the information contained in the covariances among the
errors of our reduced-form equations, which asymptotically increases the efﬁciency of the
estimators. The 3SLS method is most appropriate when examining a simultaneous
relationship like risk and return trade-offs, because the parameters in the system are
estimated jointly. Graddy and Kyle use three-stage least squares (3SLS) in their
simultaneous framework, while Clark (1986a, 1986b) and Lindley, Verbrugge, McNulty,
and Gup (1992) use two-stage least squares. 3SLS analysis has also been applied to non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms by Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992).
Our measure of interest-rate risk is the asset-liability maturity gap, the only measure
for which data is available for these institutions. The asset-liability maturity gap is the
difference between variable-rate assets and variable-rate liabilities, expressed as a
percentage of total assets.4 While duration is a superior measure of rate risk from a
theoretical point of view, thrift duration data are not available. Since the maturity gap
measures the sensitivity of the net interest margin (NIM) to changes in interest rates, we
use NIM as the appropriate measure of return. Our system of equations is estimated on
a pooled cross-section, time-series of approximately 35,000 quarterly observations from
1984 through the second quarter 1988.
Modeling Net Interest Margin. We posit the following functional relationship and
expected signs for the determination of NIM:
6 6 6 2 2 1            2 1
NIM5f ( r, sr, g, A, ACOMP, FFR, LCOMP, E,
1           2             2
CR3, GAP12, GAP60) , (1)
where:
r = market rate of interest;
sr = the variance of market interest rates;
g = one-year growth rate of assets;
A = the natural logarithm of total assets;
ACOMP = asset composition, the ratio of nontraditional assets (real estate
development loans, commercial and consumer loans) to total
assets;
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deposits;
LCOMP = liability composition, the ratio of borrowed funds (federal funds
purchased, repurchase agreements, Federal Home Loan Bank
advances, mortgage-backed bonds and commercial paper) to total
liabilities;
E = equity capital to total assets;
CR3 = the three-ﬁrm concentration ratio (the percent of deposits held by
the top three ﬁnancial institutions in the market);
GAP12 = the difference between rate-sensitive assets and rate-sensitive
liabilities, where rate sensitivity is measured over the upcoming
zero-to-twelve-month period, divided by total assets; and
GAP60 = the twelve-to-sixty month maturity gap.
These factors can be summarized into six categories: interest rates and volatility,
growth in assets and asset size, asset composition, liability composition and leverage,
competition, and gap ratios. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the basis in the
literature for each of these hypothesized relationships.5
Interest rates and volatility. Hanweck and Kilcollin (1984) show that, in addition to
maturity mismatches of existing assets and liabilities, current and past rates on assets and
liabilities and portfolio shifts affect NIM following changes in interest rates. Because they
lacked data on portfolio composition and liability cost, Hanweck and Kilcollin posit a
reduced-form equation in which NIM is a function of only current and past market
interest rates, reﬂecting the returns ﬁnancial institutions can earn by adding assets. The
expected sign of (r) could be either positive or negative, depending on the thrift’s funding
or gap positions. For instance, a negative sign would reﬂect the fact that thrifts are short-
funded and suffer when rates rise.
Ho and Saunders (1981) and Flannery (1981, 1983) show that ﬁnancial institution
NIMs depend on the variance of interest rates (sr). Rate volatility can also affect NIM
either positively or negatively depending on an institution’s asset-liability structure.
Growth in assets and asset size. Since asset growth results from both voluntary action
on the part of thrift management and exogenous and uncontrollable shifts in market
conditions, the expected sign for growth in assets (g) is ambiguous. Graddy and Karna
(1984) ﬁnd that the NIMs of small banks, but not of large ones, are negatively related to
changes in the rate of ﬁrm growth, implying that faster growth requires more rate-
sensitive funds and puts downward pressure on NIMs. However, asset growth and NIM
could be positively related for thrifts with an overhang of low-rate assets from the 1970s
and a management strategy aimed at growing out of the low-NIM problem.
Ho and Saunders (1981) and Allen (1988) suggest that NIMs also depend on asset size
(A). When ﬁnancial institutions are viewed as risk-averse dealers (i.e., making loans or
acquiring securities with the same maturity as liabilities to avoid interest-rate risk), Ho
and Saunders (1981) ﬁnd that the pure spread depends on the degree of bank
management risk aversion, the bank’s market structure, the average size of bank trans-
actions, and the variance of interest rates. Allen (1988) ﬁnds this pure spread also
depends on demand for various bank products and services, a type of portfolio effect.
Here, bank margins consist of the pure spread plus markups for implicit interest expense,
the opportunity cost of required reserves and deposit insurance, and default risk
THRIFT VIABILITY AND TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE LENDING 159premiums on loans. Furthermore, Allen (1988) ﬁnds that as size increases, due to the
portfolio effect, the pure margin (the margin needed to compensate for transactions
uncertainty) is reduced.
Asset composition. Lindley et al. (1992) use the ratio of real estate development loans,
consumer loans and commercial loans to total assets as a measure of asset portfolio
riskiness (ACOMP). While these higher risk assets should be associated with higher
returns, they hypothesize a negative relation. That is, imprudent use of new powers by
thrifts produced lower or negative returns.6 We maintain the same hypothesis. Flannery
(1981, 1983) also ﬁnds that bank income depends on asset composition as well as the level
and volatility of interest rates as noted earlier. Olson and Simonson (1982) and Simonson
and Hempel (1982) show that NIM depends not only on a rate effect but also on a volume
effect, a mix effect and an earnings power or “free funds” effect. The free funds ratio is
deﬁned as the proportion of earning assets ﬁnanced by non-interest-bearing liabilities. In
our study, the rate and volume effects are captured by the variables r and g, respectively.
Liability composition and leverage. We include the ratio of borrowed funds to total
liabilities as a measure of reliance on money-market liabilities. Since these are higher cost
sources of funds, we expect the sign of LCOMP to be negative.
Zarruk (1989) and Zarruk and Madura (1992) show that (under most reasonable
assumptions) increases in equity capital (E) or reductions in leverage increase a bank’s
spread or net interest margin. This result holds because the increase in equity reduces
interest expense, both through a lower proportion of assets ﬁnanced with interest-bearing
liabilities and lower rates on these liabilities through lower risk. In addition, as McShane
and Sharpe (1985) point out, equity capital is one of the best available measures of risk
aversion.
Competition. The literature on the relationship between competition and ﬁnancial
institution proﬁtability is extensive. Gilbert (1984) summarizes speciﬁc studies for thrifts,
including Verbrugge and Goldstein (1981) and Verbrugge and Schick (1976). This
research suggests that higher levels of competition or market concentration (CR3) are
associated with higher loan rates and lower rates on deposits. As such, the sign of CR3 is
expected to be positive.
Gap ratios. Since the study period is one in which interest rates were generally declining
and the yield curve was upward sloping, thrifts that funded a substantial portion of their
long-term assets with short-term funds (i.e., ran negative gaps) would be expected to have
higher net interest margins. If an institution has a one-year planning horizon, the net
interest margin for this period is dependent on the one-year gap (GAP12).7 However,
Simonson and Hempel (1982) show that simply focusing on the short-term gap and
ignoring the interest-rate risk that arises in the longer-maturity portions of the balance
sheet gives an incomplete picture of an institution’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates.
For this reason we include the sixty-month gap position (GAP60) as a determinant of
NIM.
Modeling Maturity Gap. The following equation shows the determinants of the twelve-
month maturity gap:
1 2 1 2 1 6
GAP12 = g ( r, sr, rl–s, A, CSTA, E,
1 1 1
NIM, sNIM, GAP12–1,) , (2)
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r = the short-term market interest rate;
sr = the variance of market rates of interest;
rl–s = the spread between the long-term and short-term rate of interest;
A = the natural logarithm of total assets;
CSTA = cash, marketable securities and trading account securities/total
assets;
E = equity capital/total assets;
NIM = the net interest margin;
sNIM = the variance of NIM; and
GAP12–1 = the ratio of the one-year maturity gap in the prior period to total
assets.
We use a similar equation for the twelve-to-sixty-month maturity gap.
These factors can be grouped along the following paragraphs: interest rates, asset size
and composition, leverage, the level and variance of NIM, and a lagged response.
Interest rates. Ho and Saunders (1981) and Flannery (1981, 1983) among others,
suggest that gaps change in the same direction as the level of interest rates (r). This
assumes that managers believe that high levels of rates relative to some historical norm
mean that the probability of a decline is greater. Thus, they hold a large maturity gap
position to speculate on this anticipated decline. Deshmukh, Greenbaum and Kanatas
(1983a) consider the effect of interest-rate uncertainty on the inclination of a ﬁnancial
institution to engage in maturity matching. They assert that high interest rates induce
banks to increase asset transformation. This again suggests a positive relationship
between gap and the level of rates.
Deshmukh et al. (1983a) also suggest that increased rate volatility (sr) causes a bank to
move toward the brokerage mode with a smaller maturity mismatch. Hence, the sign on
sr is hypothesized to be negative.
McNulty, Morgan and Smith (1989) and Morgan and Smith (1987a) show that the gap
position that minimizes an institution’s risk exposure to unexpected changes in short-
term deposit rates depends on the covariance of the short-term deposit rate with (1)
proﬁts from short-term lending and (2) the ﬁrm’s “burden,” deﬁned as non-interest
expense minus non-interest income. The minimum risk gap is thus a function of (a) the
relative magnitude of the spread between short-term and long-term asset yields and
short-term and long-term liability costs, and (b) the way the rate spread varies with
changes in the level of interest rates. This covariance can be measured by the slope of the
yield curve, which is measured by the difference between long- and short-term rates (rl–s).
Asset size and composition. Koppenhaver and Lee (1987) suggest that maturity gap
varies inversely with bank size (A). With access to the capital markets, large ﬁnancial
institutions rely less on retail deposits, managing the term structure of their liabilities
instead through purchased funds and hedging. Morgan and Smith (1987b) also suggest
that the gap position and the degree of economies of scope should be negatively related.
Since size and economies of scope are positively associated, they expect that asset size
and gap should be negatively related.
Deshmukh et al. (1983a) point out that a ﬁnancial intermediary’s decision to borrow
funds to actively assume interest-rate risk may be interpreted as a choice of operating
more as an asset transformer than as a broker. A broker takes deposits and makes loans
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maturity composition of its liabilities to dictate the structure of its loans and other assets.
In this framework, the choice of the degree of intermediation is inﬂuenced by uncertainty
regarding conditions of loan demand and funds supply. Therefore, the initial loanable
funds inventory (CSTA) can be considered a measure of the institution’s maturity
mismatch, its management style and aggressiveness, its asset transformation policy, 
and its subsequent interest-rate exposure. A larger loanable funds inventory suggests an
asset transformation management style, hence a larger gap (Ho and Saunders, 1981;
Koppenhaver, 1985, 1990).
Leverage and the equity capital position. A reduction in leverage may increase the
ability of an institution to take on interest-rate risk. McNulty (1987) argues that one of
the main determinants of interest-rate risk positions is the level of capital (E). Any ﬁrm
must take some risk in order to be proﬁtable; for thrift institutions, one way of earning
proﬁts is to ride the yield curve to some extent. Thrifts can afford to ride out an adverse
interest-rate move if they have a strong capital position. On the other hand, low levels of
capital increase the incentives to take risks and thus increase the moral hazard problem.
Thus, gaps may increase in absolute size as equity declines or leverage increases.
Level and variance of NIM. NIM is included to capture the simultaneous relationship
between NIM and gap (Graddy and Kyle, 1979, 1980; Clark, 1986b). If we assume that
the yield curve is upward sloping, then an institution borrowing short and lending long
(i.e., with a larger, more negative maturity gap) will exhibit a larger NIM.
Since bank asset and liability management is measured by the degree to which a high
and stable NIM is achieved over time with interest-rate uncertainty, we hypothesize that
the larger the variance of NIM (sr), the larger the gap. In other words, institutions that
are able to earn only a small spread on a matched-maturity basis will be forced to take a
larger interest-rate risk position in order to earn a competitive return.
Lagged responses. Because thrifts hold relatively illiquid, longer-term assets, an
adjustment to a new gap position cannot be achieved immediately. Therefore we include
the lagged value of the gap to total assets ratio as an independent variable in a partial
adjustment proxy.
Modeling Return on Assets. In the second part of our analysis, we construct an equation
for overall thrift proﬁtability, return on assets (ROA). The ROA equation is not a
behavioral equation. It is an accounting equation, derived directly from the thrift income
statement, which we use to estimate the ROA associated with a given NIM. Since ROA
and ROE are the most important proﬁtability ratios, we need to translate NIM into a
return on assets ratio in order to discuss the impact of maturity gap on proﬁtability. As
suggested above, if thrifts with low maturity gaps and resulting low NIMs can control
operating expenses better or earn more fee income than other thrifts, then they can
achieve comparable ROAs without as much interest-rate risk. Therefore, both NIM and
ROA need to be considered.
Since it is simply an accounting equation, ROA is not estimated as part of the
simultaneous-equations system. It is only used after the simultaneous system is estimated.
Holding other variables in the NIM equation constant at their respective means, we
estimate NIM for various one-year gap positions. These estimated NIMs are then used in
the ROA equation, holding the additional independent variables constant at their means,
to arrive at an estimated return on assets. Since most gap values are in the 0–50% range,
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increments. We then calculate the ROA associated with each NIM from equation (3). The
form of the equation is as follows:
1            1 2 2 2
ROA5h (PREDNIM, NONII, NONIE, PLL, TAX) , (3)
where:
ROA =return on assets;
PREDNIM =the predicted net interest margin, as estimated from equation (1)
of our system of equations;8
NONII =non-interest income (primarily income from fees and service
charges) relative to total assets;
NONIE =non-interest expense (wages and salaries, ofﬁce occupancy
expense, advertising, etc.) relative to total assets;
PLL =provisions for loan losses divided by total assets; and
TAX =total state and federal taxes relative to total assets.
We use predicted net interest margins rather than actual NIMs in order to capture the
effect of GAP as a determinant of NIM from the simultaneous-equations system.9 This
approach is superior to Carron and Brumbaugh (1989) who implicitly assume that all
thrifts must earn the same net interest margin to attain a certain level of proﬁtability.
In the ﬁnal part of our analysis, we estimate the gap position that a thrift needs to hold
to earn a given net interest margin. This sensitivity estimation will enable us to determine
how much interest-rate risk thrifts must accept to attain various levels of proﬁtability. We
also determine whether thrift portfolio managers can be considered risk-averse in the
context of modern ﬁnancial theory.
Data Sources
The data for this study represent a pooled cross-section and time series of over 35,000
observations. Selected characteristics of the sample are shown in Exhibit 1. Data are
quarterly balance sheet and income statement items from the ﬁrst quarter 1985 to the
second quarter 1988 for savings and loan associations that were ﬁling ﬁnancial reports
with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, insured by the FSLIC, and solvent on the
basis of generally accepted accounting principles.10
We divide our sample into the following ﬁve asset-size groups:
Group 0: All thrifts
Group 1: Total assets less than $50 million
Group 2: Total assets between $50 and $100 million
Group 3: Total assets between $100 and $300 million
Group 4: Total assets between $300 million and $1 billion 
Group 5: Total assets above $1 billion.
The sample sizes change from year to year as institutions fail, are merged out of
existence, or created through de novo charters.
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Financial (QTF) Report, as submitted to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (now
Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision). Data for the calculations of gap ratios are extracted from
Section H of the QTF Report.
To measure growth, we use the four-quarter rate of change in total assets, g. The log of
total assets, A, reﬂects the fact that many ﬁnancial institution return and operating
characteristics vary with ﬁrm size. The free-funds ratio, FFR, is represented by the ratio
of non-interest-bearing deposits to earning assets. ACOMP, the asset composition
measure, is the ratio of nontraditional assets (real estate development loans, consumer
loans and commercial loans) to total assets. On the other hand, LCOMP, the liability
composition measure, is the ratio of nontraditional liabilities (FHLB advances,
Negotiable CDs, Fed funds, and Repos) relative to total liabilities. We use total equity
capital according to GAAP standards as our measure of the thrift’s capital position, E.
We measure the inventory of loanable funds, CSTA, by the total of cash, marketable
securities and assets held in trading accounts. The percent of deposits held by the top
three ﬁnancial institutions is a proxy for the level of competition in the market, CR3. All
the explanatory variables except the market concentration ratio are scaled by total assets.
Interest rates (r) are weekly average three-month U. S. Treasury bill rates, as reported
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, converted to quarterly
averages. The spread between long-term and short-term rates (rl–s) is the ten-year rate less
the three-month rate computed from the same source. The variance of market interest
rates (sr) is a moving variance—the data for each quarter are computed from weekly
average Treasury bill rates for the three-quarter period prior to and including the quarter
under consideration.
Exhibit 1 indicates that the average ﬁrm in the sample has total assets of $345 million,
an annualized net interest margin of 2.04% (.0051 multiplied by 4), and an annualized
return on assets of 52 basis points. Lower levels of proﬁtability are reported for the larger
institutions in the sample. Equity capital ratios average 5.7%, with lower levels at the
larger thrifts. The average level of the one-year gap is –16.7% of assets. As the ﬁgures in
Exhibit 1 show, this study period is characterized by generally declining interest rates and
an upward-sloping yield curve.
Results
NIM Equation
Exhibit 2 shows the results of the NIM equation. As expected, short-term interest rates
have a negative effect on thrift institutions’ NIM because these institutions generally have
excess short-term liabilities relative to short-term assets. As a result, their margins narrow
when rates rise and increase when rates fall. As indicated, this effect was highly signiﬁcant
(t533.1). This is in contrast to the results of Ho and Saunders (1981), Flannery (1981,
1983) and Hanweck and Kilcollin (1984) for commercial banks. There is no evidence that
asset growth has the expected negative effect on NIM as found by Graddy and Karna
(1984) for small banks. In addition, NIMs decrease as asset size increases, consistent with
the theoretical and empirical work of Ho and Saunders (1981) and Allen (1988). The
positive sign of the equity capital variable is consistent with the theoretical work of
Zarruk (1989) and Zarruk and Madura (1992). The free funds ratio had the expected
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Full Groups by Size
Variable Sample 1 2 3 4 5
Asset/Liability Management Variables
Quarterly Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0013 0.0015 0.0015 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009
Quarterly Net Interest Margin (NIM) 0.0051 0.0061 0.0053 0.0048 0.0040 0.0032
Four-quarter s of NIMt–1 0.0011 0.0 012 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011
0-to-12 month maturity GAP 20.1670 20.1579 20.1554 20.1787 20.1800 20.1751
12-to-60 month maturity GAP 20.2618 20.2730 20.2609 20.2595 20.2551 20.2358
Asset Ratios
Nontraditional assets-to-total
assets (ACOMP) 0.0514 0.0471 0.0505 0.0500 0.0582 0.0681
Free-Funds Ratio (FFR) 0.0172 0.0129 0.0155 0.0192 0.0215 0.0259
Inventory of loanable funds-to-Total
Assets (CSTA) 0.1695 0.2013 0.1752 0.1520 0.1424 0.1295
Liability and Equity Ratios
FHLB advances & other borrowings-
to-total liabilities (LCOMP) 0.0619 0.0254 0.0448 0.0635 0.1054 0.2070
Equity capital-to-total assets (E) 0.0569 0.0680 0.0565 0.0510 0.0485 0.0486
Size, Growth and Concentration
Log of total Assets (A) 11.5480 10.1288 11.1549 12.0057 13.1018 14.6579
Growth rate in assets (g) 20.6692 21.0191 20.9653 20.8334 20.3557 2.2164
Three-ﬁrm Concentration Ratio (CR3) 0.6106 0.6922 0.6268 0.5755 0.5378 0.4635
Other Descriptive Statistics
Total assets ($000s) 345,826 28,487 71,263 171,922 521,946 3,299,83
Total common equity ($000s) 17,452 1,815 4,020 8,656 25,267 165,287
Sample size 34,897 10,336 8,200 10,016 4,129 2,216
Notes: The sample means are for the full sample, and then for each size-category subgroup.
Averages are calculated from the ﬁrst quarter 1985 through the second quarter 1988.
Panel B
Variable Mean 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Interest-Rate Environment Proxies
3–month Treasury bill rate (r) 7.04 9.45 7.50 6.00 5.75 5.95
s of the 3–month T-bill rate (sr) 1.37 2.10 1.08 1.35 1.28 0.75
Treasury spread (10-year - 3–month) (rl-s) 2.59 2.90 3.20 1.55 2.65 2.70
Notes: The sample means are for the full period, and then for each year. Averages are calculated
from the ﬁrst quarter through the fourth quarter for each year, excpet for 1988 where only the ﬁrst
two quarters are used.positive sign, consistent with Olsen and Simonson (1982) and Simonson and Hempel
(1982). The nontraditional asset ratio has a positive effect on NIM. Lindley et al. (1992)
use this ratio as a measure of the extent to which individual thrift institutions ventured
outside their traditional areas of specialization, into such areas as high-risk real estate
development lending. The positive coefﬁcient for NTA is in contrast to their ﬁnding of a
negative relationship between NTA and thrift proﬁtability for a sample of new
institutions.
The results also show that thrifts that use a higher percentage of Federal Home Loan
Bank advances and other borrowed funds have lower net interest margins, and that this
effect is highly signiﬁcant. This is a reasonable and expected result since these liabilities
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Exhibit 2
Three-Stage Regression Results for the Net Interest Margin
Groups by Size
Full
Explanatory Variables Sample 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.0104*** 1 1 1 1 1
(58.129)
3–month Treasury bill rate 20.0005*** 2 2 2 2 2
(233.122)
s of the 3–month T-bill rate 20.0005*** 2 2 2 2 2
(211.982)
Growth rate in assets 1.1E-6 · 2 · · ·
(0.469)
Log of total assets 20.0004*** 2 2 2 2 ·
(236.969 )
Equity capital-to-total assets 0.0313*** 1 1 1 1 1
(85.383)
Nontraditional assets-to-total 0.0065*** 1 1 1 1 1
assets (27.559)
FHLB advances & other 20.0067*** 2 2 2 2 2
borrowings-to-total liabilities (-29.467)
Free-funds ratio 0.0025*** 1 2 1 · ·
(3.275)
0-to-12 month maturity GAP 20.0052*** 2 2 2 2 2
(240.215)
12-to-60 month maturity GAP 20.0001 2 · 1 1 ·
(21.060)
Three-ﬁrm concentration ratio 0.0002*** 1 1 · 2 1
(4.815)
Durbin-Watson test statistic 1.96 1.98 1.97 1.93 1.83 2.07
System-weighted R2 .72 .74 .72 .70 .67 .70
Notes: Results appear for the entire sample of solvent, FSLIC-insured savings and loan
associations from the ﬁrst quarter of 1985 through the second quarter of 1988, as well as for each
of the subgroups. T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath the regression coefﬁcients. 
*** indicates signiﬁcance at the .01 level. For each of the subgroups, a “1” sign indicates that the
coefﬁcient in the regression is positive and signiﬁcant, a “2” sign indicates that the coefﬁcient in
the regression is negative and signiﬁcant, and a “·” indicates that the coefﬁcient in the regression
was not signiﬁcant at the least restrictive .10 level.have higher costs. The zero-to-twelve-month gap has a highly signiﬁcant negative
coefﬁcient (t540.2). Since the vast majority of thrift institutions have negative gap
positions in the zero-to-twelve-month range, a decrease in GAP12i reﬂects an increase in
interest-rate risk, i.e., a move to a more negative gap. Such an increase in interest-rate risk
produces a statistically signiﬁcant increase in thrift NIM, according to the results in
Exhibit 2. This suggests that there were tremendous advantages to “riding the yield
curve” during this period. The Carron and Brumbaugh hypothesis would suggest that
most observed thrift proﬁtability is the result of interest-rate speculation. The results
presented here are consistent with their argument that the industry is not viable on a
matched-maturity basis. The coefﬁcient of the three-ﬁrm concentration ratio also had the
expected positive sign and is signiﬁcant. This is consistent with a large body of literature
that suggests that market structure affects ﬁnancial institution performance.11 The ﬁt of
the equations is much higher than that of many cross-sectional ﬁnancial institution
studies. R2 equals .72 for the sample as a whole, and never falls below .67 for any
subsample.
Gap Equations
The regression results for equation (2), the ﬁrst gap position equation, appear in Exhibit
3 and provide evidence that thrift ﬁnancial managers are not risk averse. For example, the
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the Treasury bill rate indicates that thrifts do adjust their gaps as
interest rates change, rather than setting the gap at a predetermined level dictated, for
example, by the institution’s asset-liability management policy.12 Furthermore, their
behavior involves interest-rate speculation. Speciﬁcally, the sign of the coefﬁcient of the
rate variable is negative, indicating that as rates increase, the gap becomes more negative
(it increases). This indicates that movements to a higher interest-rate risk position occur
when the rewards from such a move are high. This is consistent with the argument of
Deshmukh et al. (1983a,b) that high interest rates induce ﬁnancial institutions to
undertake more asset transformation and assume more balance sheet mismatch.
The standard deviation of interest rates has a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient, indicating
that as rate volatility increases, gaps become more negative (they increase). This again
suggests an increase in interest-rate speculation when the potential rewards are high. This
behavior is contrary to that which would be predicted by the theoretical argument of
Deshmukh et al. (1983a,b) that increased volatility in interest rates causes a bank to move
more to the brokerage mode, with less maturity mismatch. A risk-averse ﬁnancial
manager faced with greater rate variability would, no doubt, reduce his gap position to
reduce the probability of insolvency. On balance, however, institutions in this industry
did the opposite. This moral hazard problem facing institutions with federally insured
deposits has been widely discussed in the ﬁnancial institutions literature.
In contrast to Koppenhaver and Lee’s (1987) results for commercial banks, there is no
signiﬁcant relationship between gap and asset size. The inventory of loanable funds
(liquid assets as a percent of total assets) is our proxy for the intermediary’s decision to
borrow funds in advance to actively assume interest-rate risk. Based on the argument of
Deshmukh et al. (1983a,b), such an inventory represents a management decision to
operate more as an asset transformer than as a broker. This decision would suggest that
an increase in loanable funds would be associated with a larger (i.e., more negative) gap.
However, this variable has a signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient. The coefﬁcient reﬂects
THRIFT VIABILITY AND TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE LENDING 167the deﬁnition of gap (rate sensitive assets less rate sensitive liabilities); ceteris paribus, an
institution with more short-term assets has less interest-rate risk.
The sign of the coefﬁcient of the equity capital variable is negative, indicating that as
capital levels increase, gaps become more negative (they increase). This suggests that
interest-rate risk increases as institutions are more able to bear it. However, the sign is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, there is no evidence in this equation that deteriorating
capital positions lead institutions to speculate on interest rates. 
As the slope of the yield curve (measured here by the spread between ten-year and three-
month rates) increases, the proﬁts from borrowing short term and lending long term
clearly increase. The results indicate that, as the yield curve becomes steeper, gaps become
more positive (they decrease). This result suggests that, on balance, thrifts are not
attempting to obtain additional returns from interest-rate speculation when the yield
curve steepens. 
The sign of the coefﬁcient for prior quarter NIM is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating
that, as NIM increases, gaps become more negative (they increase). While we are using a
simultaneous-equations system, we cannot separate cause and effect. It could be that the
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Exhibit 3
Three-Stage Regression Results for the 0-to-12 Month GAP
Groups by Size
Full
Explanatory Variables Sample 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 20.0404*** 2 · · · ·
(28.261)
3–month Treasury bill rate 20.0027*** + + + · ·
(25.800)
s of the 3–month T-bill rate 20.0041*** · · 2 2 ·
(23.237)
Treasury spread (10-year–3-month) 0.0034*** + + + · +
(5.704)
Log of total assets 20.0004 2 · · · ·
(21.483)
Inventory of loanable funds-to- 0.0328*** + + + · +
total assets (10.516)
Prior quarter equity capital-to- 20.0176 2 · · · +
total assets (21.610)
Prior quarter 0-to-12 month  0.8676*** + + + + +
maturity GAP  (374.676)
Prior quarter quarterly net  20.5565*** + 2 2 2 2
interest margin (23.843)
Prior quarter standard deviation  20.0335 · · · · ·
of NIM (20.118)
Durbin-Watson test statistic 2.35 2.25 2.05 2.05 1.89 2.08
Notes: T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath the regression coefﬁcients. *** Indicates
signiﬁcance at the .01 level. For each of the subgroups, a “+” sign indicates that the coefﬁcient in
the regression is positive and signiﬁcant, a “2” sign indicates that the coefﬁcient in the regression
is negative and signiﬁcant, and a “·” indicates that the coefﬁcient in the regression was not
signiﬁcant at the least restrictive .10 level. Three-stage least squares does not produce equation-
speciﬁc R2 ﬁgures, producing instead a system weighted R2. This R2 ﬁgure can be found in Exhibit 2.increase in the GAP is causing the increase in the net interest margin, rather than the
reverse. This is likely since the coefﬁcient of GAP in the NIM equation (Exhibit 2) was
negative and highly signiﬁcant (t540.2). In other words, the combination of the previous
period gap and interest rates determines the current net interest margin. The coefﬁcient
for the previous period gap is positive with a sign slightly less than one and is highly
signiﬁcant. Since thrift institutions hold primarily long-term assets, the adjustment to a
new gap position comes only slowly.
The results for the twelve-to-sixty-month gap equation are shown in Exhibit 4 and are
generally consistent with those for the short-term gap with the exception of the capital
variable and the slope of the yield curve. The coefﬁcient of the lagged equity capital
variable is negative and signiﬁcant. In other words, increased capital levels are associated
with larger (more negative) gaps. This provides one of the few indications of risk-averse
behavior—interest-rate risk is assumed by those institutions that are best able to bear
such risk. The slope of the yield curve variable is negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests
that, for this particular gap measure, thrifts do take on more risk when the yield curve
steepens and the rewards from a mismatched maturity position are high.
ROA Equation
Exhibit 5 contains the results of the regression run on the ROA equation. The results
show that a 10-basis-point increase in the net interest margin increases ROA by 6.3 basis
points. A 10-basis-point increase in non-interest income (primarily fee income) increases
ROA by 7.2 basis points. A 10-basis-point increase in non-interest expense (wages and
salaries, advertising, etc.) decreases ROA by 7.5 basis points. A 10-basis-point increase in
provisions for loan losses decreases ROA by approximately the same amount. An increase
in taxes has a much smaller effect than any of the other variables. In addition, smaller
thrifts are more proﬁtable than larger ones.13
Proﬁtability Simulation Results
To illustrate the importance of our ﬁndings in determining the thrift’s viability as a
traditional mortgage lender, we estimate overall thrift proﬁtability in a two-step process
employing the net interest margin equation and then, the return on assets equation. The















THRIFT VIABILITY AND TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE LENDING 169The net interest margin of 1.70% associated with a zero maturity gap produces a return
on assets of only 19 basis points. Given a 5% capital position (an equity multiplier of 20),
this translates into a return on equity of only 4%. However, the rewards from interest-rate
speculation are substantial. Thrifts can increase their net interest margins by over 100
basis points and their return on assets by about 65 basis points by maintaining a negative
gap position and riding the yield curve. Given a 5% capital position (an equity multiplier
of 20), a thrift institution that wanted to earn a 12% return on equity would have had to
run a gap of about 230%. The risks from a 230% gap are substantial if interest rates
were to increase.
The regulatory importance of these ﬁndings is signiﬁcant. Similar to Carron and
Brumbaugh, we conclude that a thrift industry composed primarily of specialized
mortgage lenders cannot be reasonably proﬁtable without signiﬁcant interest-rate risk. In
addition, thrift proﬁtability would be cut by an estimated 55% (from 42 basis points to
19) if all institutions followed a matched-maturity strategy. While these results are speciﬁc
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Exhibit 4
Three-Stage Regression Results for the 12-to-60 Month GAP
Groups by Size
Full
Explanatory Variables Sample 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.2397*** + + + + +
(30.852)
3–Month Treasury bill rate 20.0299*** 2 2 2 2 2
(24 0.922)
s of the 3–month T-bill rate 20.0671*** 2 2 2 2 2
(233.589)
Treasury spread (10-year– 20.0172*** 2 2 2 2 2
3-month) (218.058)
Log of total assets 0.0022*** + · · · ·
(5.377)
Inventory of loanable funds-to- 0.0901*** + + + + +
total assets (18.440)
Prior quarter equity capital-to- 20.0620*** · 2 2 + ·
total assets (23.587)
Prior quarter 12-to-60 month  0.8561*** + + + + +
maturity GAP  (359.988)
Prior quarter quarterly net  21.1480*** 2 + · · ·
interest margin (25.081)
Prior quarter standard deviation  4.1716*** + + + + ·
of NIM (9.375)
Durbin-Watson test statistic 2.16 1.97 1.82 1.93 1.82 2.08
Notes: T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath the regression coefﬁcients. 
*** indicates signiﬁcance at the .01 level. For each of the subgroups, a “+” sign indicates that the
coefﬁcient in the regression is positive and signiﬁcant, a “2” sign indicates that the coefﬁcient in
the regression is negative and signiﬁcant, and a “·” indicates that the coefﬁcient in the regression
was not signiﬁcant at the least restrictive .10 level. Three-stage least squares does not produce
equation-speciﬁc R2 ﬁgures, producing instead a system-weighted R2. This R2 ﬁgure can be found
in Exhibit 2.to the period under consideration, they are illustrative of the returns that thrifts can
obtain from interest-rate speculation. A substantial portion of observed thrift
proﬁtability is the result of interest-rate speculation. This is consistent with developments
in 1992 and early 1993 when interest rates fell and thrift proﬁtability soared.
Conclusions
The traditional thrift strategy of borrowing short term and lending long term contributed
substantially to thrift proﬁtability during the period immediately prior to FIRREA. In
fact, according to our estimates, over half of thrift proﬁtability during the period under
consideration appears to be the result of this type of speculative behavior. Thrifts increase
their risk exposure when the gains from this type of strategy are greatest, namely when
interest rates are high. Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that thrifts adjust their
gaps in ways that suggest that they may not be risk-averse portfolio managers.
Speciﬁcally, they increase their interest-rate risk exposure, rather than decreasing it, when
the variance of interest rates increases. These results suggest that thrift interest-rate risk
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Exhibit 5
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions for the Return on Assets (ROA)
Groups by Size
Full
Explanatory Variables Sample 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.0011*** + + · · +
(5.987)
Predicted net interest margin 0.6333*** + + + + +
(54.555)
Non-interest income-to-total 
assets 0.7249*** + + + + +
(155.653)
Non-interest expense-to-total 
assets 20.7493*** 2 2 · 2 2
(2119.701)
Provision for loan losses-to-
total assets 20.9788*** 2 2 2 2 2
(2152.184)
Total taxes-to-total assets 20.0792*** 2 2 2 2 2
(26.278)
Log of total assets 24. 0E-5*** 2 2 · · ·
(23.237)
Adjusted R2 .72 .70 .78 .70 .76 .80
Notes: Results appear for the entire sample of solvent, FSLIC-insured savings and loan
associations from the ﬁrst quarter of 1985 through the second quarter of 1988, as well as for each
of the subgroups. T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath the regression coefﬁcients. 
*** indicates signiﬁcance at the .01 level. For each of the subgroups, a “+” sign indicates that the
coefﬁcient in the regression is positive and signiﬁcant, a “2” sign indicates that the coefﬁcient in
the regression is negative and signiﬁcant, and a “·” indicates that the coefﬁcient in the regression
was not signiﬁcant at the least restrictive .10 level.was not regulated as strictly as it should have been during the period prior to FIRREA.
Like Carron and Brumbaugh (1987, 1989, 1990), we ﬁnd that the net interest margin
associated with a fully matched-maturity position is insufﬁcient for most thrifts to earn
acceptable returns on assets and equity. In addition, the rewards from interest-rate
speculation are substantial. Thrifts can increase their net interest margins by up to 100
basis points and their return on assets by approximately 65 basis points by increasing
their gaps.
Our evidence also suggests that the most prudent regulatory course is one expanding
the asset and liability powers of thrifts, rather than the more recent regulatory attempts
to restrict investment in non-mortgage assets.
Appendix
Predicted Values
Decile Annualized (%) Annualized (%) (%)
Rankings Return on Assets Net Interest Margin 0–12 Month Gap
1 (highest) 1.94 2.17 221.46
2 1.30 2.29 221.78
3 1.05 2.19 218.95
4 0.88 2.07 218.76
5 0.73 1.97 215.46
6 0.58 1.88 215.37
7 0.43 1.78 215.28
8 0.27 1.68 215.22
9 0.02 1.58 214.27
10 (lowest) 20.68 1.65 215.42
Notes: Decile rankings are based on the predicted values for return on assets from the ordinary
least squares regression. The predicted values for net interest margin and the 0–12-month gap are
determined using the three-stage least squares system.
Notes
1 The terms “short funded,” “riding the yield curve,” “borrowing short and lending long,” and
“running a negative gap,” are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
2 The maturity gap is the difference between variable-rate assets and variable-rate liabilities,
expressed as a percentage of total assets. The net interest margin is the difference between interest
income and interest expense, expressed as a percent of total assets.
3 As Morgan and Smith (1987) and McNulty, Morgan and Smith (1995) point out, there are
reasons why a ﬁnancial institution may want to depart from a zero-gap strategy. Such a strategy
prevents institutions from earning the liquidity premium imbedded in the term structure.
4 Gap is used frequently in academic discussions of interest-rate risk (Flannery, 1981, 1983; Morgan
and Smith, 1987; Koch, 1992; Rose, 1993). Alternately, Akella and Greenbaum (1992) use the
relative speeds at which revenues and costs adjust to interest-rate changes to estimate the duration
of assets and liabilities.
5 Other factors that may affect NIM, such as those considered by Ho and Saunders (1981) and
Allen (1988), are captured through the maturity gap positions that are modelled next. For example,
management’s tendency to ride the yield curve by borrowing short and lending long reﬂects its
degree of risk aversion.
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Thrifts expected higher returns from these activities, but these returns frequently did not
materialize.
7 See, for example, Rose (1993), Ch. 15.
8 Predicted values for net interest margin are derived from the three-stage least squares system
using the SAS procedure SIMLIN on the output matrix from the SYSLIN procedure.
9 When we estimate equation (3) using actual NIMs, R2 is above 99% and all of the signs are as
expected.
10 The time frame of the study is dictated by the availability of data. Thrift maturity gap data are
not available for periods prior to 1984. Signiﬁcant reporting errors in the 1984 data would argue
strongly for exclusion of these earlier reports, even if they were available to the authors. Figures for
this three and one-half year period were obtained by the authors in 1991 as the result of a special
project. In addition, major changes in the report form in 1990 make it impossible to pool data
beyond 1989.
11 Gilbert (1984) thoroughly reviews this literature.
12 Such policy statements, while often vague and not widely followed, have been required of thrift
managers by federal regulators since 1984.
13 This is similar to the results of comparisons of return on assets for various asset size groups for
commercial banks. See, for example, Koch (1992), p. 134. 
14 This is the approximate sample mean. The 42-basis-point-estimated-ROA at this sample mean
compares with an actual mean annualized ROA of 52 basis points (.0013 3 4; from Exhibit 1). This
again suggests that the regression results are reasonable. The estimated and actual mean NIMs are
even closer, 2.07% vs. 2.04%, respectively.
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